A fifth year of full-scale war is defined by drones, industrial endurance, manpower, long-range strikes and a front that moves slowly despite extraordinary losses.
Russia retains roughly one-fifth of Ukraine and the larger resource base, but its advance slowed sharply in 2026 and Ukraine regained ground in the southeast. Neither side currently has the force-to-space ratio or political room for a decisive campaign. The military balance is a grinding, adaptive stalemate with local initiative changing by sector.
Moscow rejects the post-Soviet settlement that left Ukraine independent and increasingly oriented toward Europe. Kyiv’s view is straightforward: a larger neighbor used force to deny its sovereign political choice.
Russia cites NATO enlargement and strategic encirclement; Ukraine and NATO members argue those concerns cannot justify invasion or annexation. The dispute is real, but it does not erase agency or legal responsibility.
The seizure of Crimea and fighting in Donbas created a militarized status quo. Failed Minsk implementation and mutual distrust left force as Moscow’s chosen instrument in 2022.
Russia annexes Crimea and backs separatist entities after Ukraine’s Maidan revolution.
Russian forces attack from north, east and south; Ukraine prevents the seizure of Kyiv.
Ukraine retakes Kharkiv-region and Kherson territory; both sides build dense defensive systems.
Russia uses manpower, glide bombs and artillery to take ground slowly at high cost.
Russia launches more than 2,800 drones during August, including a surge of faster jet-powered models, while Ukraine expands long-range strikes on Russian logistics and energy targets.
U.S. envoys meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow and then travel to Kyiv without a breakthrough. Russia resumes major missile and drone attacks after a temporary three-day halt in strikes on the capital.
After President Trump said both sides had agreed to halt attacks on energy infrastructure, Russia launched 200 drones and struck Ukrainian energy and port sites while Ukraine hit a Russian refinery and drone-production facilities. Kyiv said it required credible guarantees before stopping.
Choose a map layer, then tap the numbered points to understand why each place matters.
Almost entirely Russian-controlled; supports pressure west into Donetsk.
Generalized public-source operational map. Tactical positions can change daily. Boundaries use Natural Earth public-domain geography. Control overlays are generalized editorial estimates from the report's cited public sources and are not suitable for navigation, targeting or legal boundary claims.
Ukrainian armed forces, territorial defense, security services; European and other external support
Russian armed forces, Rosgvardia, occupation authorities and foreign support including North Korean matériel and personnel
Rows may use different dates and definitions. They are not designed to be summed.
UN figure reported Aug. 2026; actual deaths in occupied and destroyed areas are likely higher.
Official and Western analytical figures diverge sharply; neither is fully auditable in wartime.
Russia does not publish a credible current total; definitions include regulars, auxiliaries and missing differently.
Counts vary by inclusion of occupied territories and combatant status.
Restricted access, propaganda incentives, missing bodies, repeated injuries, different time windows and inconsistent treatment of fighters, auxiliaries and indirect deaths. The most honest answer is often a bounded range with a date.
Direct military outlays are only one layer. We also track destroyed assets, lost output, disrupted trade and reconstruction.
SIPRI estimate equal to roughly 40% of GDP; does not include all external in-kind aid.
High—SIPRI estimate confidence basisExplore the base case across four horizons, then inspect the mutually exclusive near-term scenarios.
Continued positional war with high civilian harm and competing local gains; no decisive collapse is the base case.
The front shifts locally without a strategic breakthrough; both sides continue deep strikes.
Probabilities are independent editorial estimates for the stated horizon and sum to 100%. They are not intelligence assessments or investment advice.
Ceasefire line, international monitoring, maritime rules and phased humanitarian measures without forcing immediate recognition of annexation.
Credible guarantees for Ukraine paired with force/posture constraints and a long process for territory.
One side breaks the other’s military capacity sufficiently to dictate terms.
Preliminary lessons—not universal laws. Adversaries adapt, technologies interact with terrain, and survivorship bias is powerful.
Cheap drones compress the sensor-to-shooter cycle and make massed movement difficult without electronic and air-defense cover.
Shells, interceptors, drones, repair capacity and replacement personnel matter more over years than exquisite systems in small numbers.
Mines, trenches and obstacles channel attackers; combined arms remains necessary but far harder under persistent surveillance.
Attacks on energy and logistics impose costs and change allocation, but rarely substitute for ground control by themselves.
Russia holds more Ukrainian territory and has the larger resource base. Ukraine prevented Russia’s original political objective, remains sovereign and regained local initiative in parts of the southeast in 2026. Overall: no decisive winner, with Russia ahead territorially and the strategic outcome unresolved.
Public estimates place Russian control at roughly 19–20%, including Crimea and areas occupied before February 2022. Exact tactical control changes continuously.
Both governments restrict data; analysts count wounded, missing, auxiliaries and repeated injuries differently. Official killed figures and modeled total-casualty estimates answer different questions.
Direct NATO–Russia combat remains low probability because of nuclear escalation risk. Training, intelligence, air defense and arms support can deepen without crossing that threshold.
Direct links used for the dated facts in this edition. Analysis also cross-checks open-source reporting across institutions.
This report synthesizes public information available through September 15, 2026. Front lines and casualty totals can change before the page is updated. Forecasts are the site’s own probabilistic judgments, not claims made by the linked sources.