Two armies inside one state
The RSF grew from Janjaweed forces into an autonomous national paramilitary with its own wealth and chain of command. A plan to integrate it into the SAF threatened both leaders’ power.

The army holds the east and retook Khartoum; the RSF dominates Darfur. Kordofan is the hinge in a de facto partition with mass atrocities, famine and drone warfare.
The SAF improved its position by retaking the capital and central corridors, but the RSF consolidated Darfur and can strike deep with drones. The war is not close to a national military decision. The likeliest trajectory is hardened east–west partition and competition for Kordofan, not reunification under either force.
The RSF grew from Janjaweed forces into an autonomous national paramilitary with its own wealth and chain of command. A plan to integrate it into the SAF threatened both leaders’ power.
Burhan and Hemedti jointly removed Omar al-Bashir, then derailed civilian rule in a 2021 coup. Their alliance collapsed over the distribution of power in a renewed transition.
Gold, smuggling and cross-border arms give both camps resources outside public accountability. Competing regional backers reduce the incentive to compromise.
SAF and RSF cooperate in removing the dictator, then share power with civilians.
Burhan and Hemedti derail the transition and deepen Sudan’s political crisis.
Dispute over command and integration erupts into urban fighting.
SAF retakes Khartoum; RSF captures El Fasher and consolidates the west.
The central front becomes decisive while both sides expand long-range attacks.
WFP says Sudan funding fell from $645 million in 2025 to $206 million by mid-September 2026, leaving a nearly $300 million gap to sustain current operations as almost 20 million people face hunger.
Choose a map layer, then tap the numbered points to understand why each place matters.
RSF core territory after the fall of El Fasher; highest mass-atrocity risk.
Generalized public-source control map. Sudan contains many allied and local forces; the two-color picture intentionally simplifies fragmented authority. Boundaries use Natural Earth public-domain geography. Control overlays are generalized editorial estimates from the report's cited public sources and are not suitable for navigation, targeting or legal boundary claims.
National army under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; allied former rebels and militias; support from Egypt and others
Paramilitary under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, allied Arab militias and SPLM-N partners in some areas
Rows may use different dates and definitions. They are not designed to be summed.
Sudan’s health ministry total covers most states but cannot access all areas.
Reuters cited experts who emphasize hunger, disease and inaccessible mass killings; do not add this range to official direct deaths.
Event-data fatalities are estimates and not a cumulative all-cause toll.
Displacement changes quickly and includes internal and cross-border movement.
Restricted access, propaganda incentives, missing bodies, repeated injuries, different time windows and inconsistent treatment of fighters, auxiliaries and indirect deaths. The most honest answer is often a bounded range with a date.
Direct military outlays are only one layer. We also track destroyed assets, lost output, disrupted trade and reconstruction.
UNDP estimate reported April 2026; the war set development back decades.
Medium-high confidence basisExplore the base case across four horizons, then inspect the mutually exclusive near-term scenarios.
Fighting intensifies around Kordofan and Blue Nile; civilian conditions worsen regardless of modest territorial change.
SAF and RSF consolidate rival zones without a recognized border or peace.
Probabilities are independent editorial estimates for the stated horizon and sum to 100%. They are not intelligence assessments or investment advice.
Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and other suppliers align behind an arms halt, monitoring and humanitarian access.
Exclude commanders from unilateral control of the transition and build local civilian representation into negotiations.
Formalize a ceasefire between zones to stop immediate killing.
Preliminary lessons—not universal laws. Adversaries adapt, technologies interact with terrain, and survivorship bias is powerful.
Security-sector integration without a single civilian chain of command leaves existential rivalries intact.
An actor without traditional air superiority can attack distant capitals and infrastructure with imported systems.
Gold routes, border access and sponsors can sustain forces even after formal financial isolation.
Siege, market fragmentation and aid obstruction become instruments that reshape territory and populations.
The SAF controls the recognized state core and retook Khartoum; the RSF controls most of Darfur. Neither is close to national victory. The map increasingly resembles partition.
No credible comprehensive count exists. The health ministry documented about 11,209 direct deaths in accessible areas, while experts believe excess mortality from violence, hunger and disease is in the hundreds of thousands.
Several outside powers back different parties or prioritize influence over a unified peace strategy. Diplomacy without control over weapons and finance has little leverage.
It is a national war with roots and actors connected to Darfur. The RSF evolved from Janjaweed structures, and ethnic mass violence in Darfur is again central.
Direct links used for the dated facts in this edition. Analysis also cross-checks open-source reporting across institutions.
This report synthesizes public information available through September 14, 2026. Front lines and casualty totals can change before the page is updated. Forecasts are the site’s own probabilistic judgments, not claims made by the linked sources.