State absence and abusive presence
Many rural communities see little service delivery but experience predation by security forces, militias or officials. Armed groups exploit disputes and offer coercive forms of order.
Severe intensityEscalatingSince 2012
The Central Sahel Insurgencies
Jihadist groups are expanding through Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger while military governments trade Western partnerships for Russian support and struggle to hold rural territory.
2025 violent deaths10,000+Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, ACLED
JNIM strength7,000–8,000UN estimate reported Aug. 2026
Niamey mutinyAug. 29–30Airbase retaken with Russian Africa Corps support
State allianceAESMali, Burkina Faso and Niger
01
Executive assessment01 02 03
The bottom line
JNIM has the strongest momentum: it is expanding pressure on roads, towns, mines and coastal approaches while avoiding the burden of governing every village. The three military governments retain capitals and heavy weapons but have not solved the intelligence, legitimacy or force-density problems that drive the insurgency. Niger’s August mutiny showed regime fragility and Russia’s ability to protect a partner, not a strategic reversal against the insurgency.
Cross-border sanctuary
Long borders and peripheral terrain allow fighters to move between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and coastal states faster than national forces coordinate.
Coups and partnership churn
Military takeovers promised security but disrupted institutions and replaced French/U.S. relationships with Russian support without solving the local political problem.
How this war reached its current phase
Mali rebellion and jihadist takeover
Separatist and jihadist forces seize northern territory before French intervention.
Regional spread
JNIM and Islamic State affiliates expand into central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Coups
Military governments take power in all three core states, citing security failure.
AES consolidation
The juntas leave ECOWAS structures, deepen Russian ties and form a security alliance.
Niger mutiny suppressed
Mutinous soldiers seize a key Niamey airbase before Nigerien loyalists retake it with direct support from Russia’s Africa Corps, exposing internal military strain.
02
Interactive operational picture
Pressure points and lines of control
Choose a map layer, then tap the numbered points to understand why each place matters.
GEOGRAPHIC BASENetworked insurgent influence and state corridorsAssessment: September 8, 2026
Side A / coalition Side B / opposition Active / contested Aid / access
Selected pressure point
Central Mali
JNIM embeds in local conflicts and pressures transport arteries.
Generalized public-source regional map. Insurgent influence is networked and seasonal; it should not be read as continuous territorial ownership. Boundaries use Natural Earth public-domain geography. Control overlays are generalized editorial estimates from the report's cited public sources and are not suitable for navigation, targeting or legal boundary claims.
03
Order of battle
Who is fighting—and what each side needs
Side A
Alliance of Sahel States
Military-led governments and armed forces of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger; local auxiliaries; Russian Africa Corps support
- Political objective
- Restore territorial control, protect regimes and build a sovereign regional security architecture.
- Principal advantage
- Heavy weapons, aircraft, state authority and a planned 15,000-strong joint force.
- Binding constraint
- Vast terrain, weak intelligence, internal military cohesion, abusive tactics, poor services and limited troop density.
Side B
Jihadist insurgencies
Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province, plus local cells and support networks
- Political objective
- Erode state authority, control routes and communities, tax economic activity and expand regional sanctuary.
- Principal advantage
- Mobility, local deals, cross-border depth, low operating cost and adaptive financing.
- Binding constraint
- Rivalry, limited ability to govern cities and vulnerability when concentrated.
04
Human cost
Casualties, without false precision
Rows may use different dates and definitions. They are not designed to be summed.
Party / populationKilledWoundedWhat the number misses
Regional 2025 total10,000+Unknown
ACLED political-violence estimate across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger through Nov. 28, 2025.
CiviliansThousands annuallyUnknown
Killed by insurgents, state forces and allied militias; attribution is often disputed.
State forces / auxiliariesThousands cumulativelyUnknown
Governments restrict loss reporting and attacks on remote bases can be undercounted.
JNIM / IS SahelThousands claimedUnknown
Official claims are not consistently verifiable and may count civilians as militants.
Why estimates diverge
Restricted access, propaganda incentives, missing bodies, repeated injuries, different time windows and inconsistent treatment of fighters, auxiliaries and indirect deaths. The most honest answer is often a bounded range with a date.
05
Financial burden
What the war is costing each side
Direct military outlays are only one layer. We also track destroyed assets, lost output, disrupted trade and reconstruction.
Best available cost signalDefense burden nearly doubled
IMF: from 2.7% of GDP in 2016 to 4.6% in 2023; current national burdens vary.
High historical trend confidence basisCost stack
01 Military operations
02 Asset destruction
03 Lost economic output
04 Long-term care & reconstruction
06
Outcomes lab
What happens next?
Explore the base case across four horizons, then inspect the mutually exclusive near-term scenarios.
Base-case outlook · Medium-high confidence
1/4Violence remains highest in Burkina Faso and Mali, with further pressure on commerce and border regions.
Selected scenario
0%
Insurgent expansion, state urban hold
Militants expand rural influence and economic interdiction without taking capitals.
Signals that would raise this probabilityMore road sieges, mine attacks and coastal-state incidents.
Probabilities are independent editorial estimates for the stated horizon and sum to 100%. They are not intelligence assessments or investment advice.
07
Paths out
Potential solutions—and why they fail
Path 01Practical
Population-corridor strategy
Secure roads, markets and service hubs persistently rather than sweeping vast empty terrain.
Path 02Essential
Local political compacts
Resolve land, pastoral, taxation and representation disputes that armed groups exploit.
Path 03Useful
Regional intelligence and finance pressure
Coordinate borders, ransom policy, gold flows and coastal early warning.
08
Military science01 02 03 04
What this war is teaching
Preliminary lessons—not universal laws. Adversaries adapt, technologies interact with terrain, and survivorship bias is powerful.
Terrain favors the side that needs less
Insurgents can influence a region by controlling movement and fear; states must protect people and infrastructure continuously.
Regime security is not population security
Coups can centralize command while worsening legitimacy and local intelligence.
Economic warfare can outperform occupation
Roadblocks, kidnappings and mine attacks impose political costs without defending fixed terrain.
Civilian protection is operational intelligence
Abuse destroys the human networks needed to distinguish insurgents and anticipate attacks.
09
Answers in plain English
Frequently asked questions
Who is winning in the Sahel?+
JNIM and other insurgents have the momentum. Governments control capitals and can win individual battles, but militants are expanding geographic reach and economic pressure.
Do militants control most of Burkina Faso or Mali?+
Influence is not the same as continuous administration. Militants may move, tax, threaten and deny access across large areas while states still hold towns and garrisons.
Has Russian support improved security?+
It has added regime protection, training and strike capacity; Africa Corps helped loyalists retake Niamey’s airbase after the August mutiny. Public conflict trends still do not show a strategic reversal against the insurgencies, and civilian-harm allegations can worsen recruitment for armed groups.
Why are coastal states at risk?+
Northern Benin and Togo connect Sahel networks to new sanctuaries, markets and pressure points. JNIM expansion is increasingly deliberate rather than accidental spillover.
10
Evidence ledger
Core sources
Direct links used for the dated facts in this edition. Analysis also cross-checks open-source reporting across institutions.
01
ACLED · OngoingConflict in the Sahel
↗02ACLED · Dec. 11, 2025Economic warfare beyond the Sahel
↗03Reuters / UN · Aug. 14, 2026$50 million ransom funded offensive
↗04IMF · Apr. 10, 2026Military Spending and Crowding-Out Effects
↗05Reuters · Aug. 31, 2026Niger retakes airbase after mutiny with Russian support
↗06Associated Press · Aug. 31, 2026How the Niger mutiny was suppressed
↗Editorial note
This report synthesizes public information available through September 8, 2026. Front lines and casualty totals can change before the page is updated. Forecasts are the site’s own probabilistic judgments, not claims made by the linked sources.